{ "$schema": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/jsonresume/resume-schema/v1.2.1/schema.json", "basics": { "name": "Romain Ferrali", "label": "Assistant Professor of Economics", "image": "https://rferrali.net/profile.jpg", "email": "romain.ferrali@univ-amu.fr", "url": "https://rferrali.net", "location": { "address": "5-9 Boulevard Maurice Bourdet", "postalCode": "13001", "city": "Marseille", "countryCode": "FR" }, "profiles": [ { "network": "ORCID", "url": "https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9642-8682" }, { "network": "Google Scholar", "url": "https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=hTwdRHwAAAAJ" }, { "network": "LinkedIn", "url": "https://www.linkedin.com/in/rferrali/" }, { "network": "GitHub", "url": "https://github.com/rferrali" }, { "network": "OSF", "url": "https://osf.io/bg7jh/" }, { "network": "X/Twitter", "url": "https://twitter.com/rferrali" } ], "summary": "I am an Assistant Professor of Economics at [Aix-Marseille School of Economics](https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr), where my research focuses on development and political economy, particularly in North and Sub-Saharan Africa. Using game theory and advanced quantitative methods—including network analysis, causal inference, and structural estimation—I investigate the causes of development failures. My work explores critical questions, such as: _How is corruption organized?_, _How can organizations be designed to resist it?_ and _How do authoritarian regimes control or adopt new technologies?_\n\nMy research is interdisciplinary and has been published in leading journals such as the [American Journal of Political Science](https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12471), [Games and Economic Behavior](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.013), the [Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory](https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muac026), [Management Science](https://pubsonline.informs.org/journal/mnsc), and [Science Advances](https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.adf1222). By bridging economics, political science, and organizational theory, I aim to generate insights that inform both academic debates and real-world policy challenges.\n\nThis Spring, I will be a Visiting Assistant Professor of Economics at [New York University Abu Dhabi](https://nyuad.nyu.edu/), where I will continue my research on the political economy of technology adoption in authoritarian regimes. " }, "work": [ { "name": "Aix-Marseille School of Economics", "location": "Marseille, France,", "position": "Assistant Professor", "url": "https://amse-aixmarseille.fr/", "startDate": 2021, "type": "Academic" }, { "name": "New York University Abu Dhabi", "location": "Abu Dhabi, UAE", "position": "Visiting Assistant Professor", "url": "https://nyuad.nyu.edu/", "startDate": 2025, "endDate": 2025, "type": "Academic" }, { "name": "New York University Abu Dhabi", "location": "Abu Dhabi, UAE", "position": "Postdoctoral Associate", "url": "https://nyuad.nyu.edu/", "startDate": 2018, "endDate": 2021, "type": "Academic" }, { "name": "Princeton University", "location": "Princeton, NJ", "position": "Postdoctoral Fellow", "url": "https://www.princeton.edu/", "startDate": 2018, "endDate": 2018, "type": "Academic" }, { "name": "Laetitia Consulting", "location": "Casablanca, Morocco", "position": "Statistical consultant", "startDate": 2015, "type": "Industry" }, { "name": "Tafra NGO", "location": "Rabat, Morocco", "position": "Board member and scientific director", "url": "https://www.tafra.ma/", "startDate": 2017, "endDate": 2023, "type": "Industry" }, { "name": "CSAE, department of Economics, Oxford University", "location": "Oxford, UK", "position": "Research Assistant", "url": "https://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/", "startDate": 2012, "endDate": 2012, "type": "Industry" } ], "education": [ { "institution": "Aix Marseille Université", "location": "Marseille", "url": "https://www.univ-amu.fr/en", "area": "Economics", "studyType": "Habilitation à Diriger des Recherches (HDR ; Habilitation to Supervise Research)", "endDate": 2025 }, { "institution": "Princeton University", "location": "Princeton, NJ", "url": "https://www.princeton.edu/", "area": "Politics", "studyType": "Ph.D.", "endDate": 2018 }, { "institution": "Princeton University", "location": "Princeton, NJ", "url": "https://www.princeton.edu/", "area": "Politics", "studyType": "M.A.", "endDate": 2014 }, { "institution": "London School of Economics", "location": "London", "url": "https://www.lse.ac.uk/", "area": "Economic History", "studyType": "M.Sc.", "endDate": 2011, "score": "Highest Honors" }, { "institution": "Science Po, Ecole Polytechnique, ENSAE", "location": "Paris", "url": "https://www.sciencespo.fr/", "area": "Economics", "studyType": "M.A.", "endDate": 2011 }, { "institution": "Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales", "location": "Paris", "url": "https://www.inalco.fr/", "area": "Arabic Literature", "studyType": "B.A.", "endDate": 2010, "score": "Honors" }, { "institution": "Science Po", "location": "Paris", "url": "https://www.sciencespo.fr/", "area": "Social Sciences", "studyType": "B.A.", "endDate": 2009, "score": "Honors", "courses": [ "Middle East Minor" ] } ], "skills": [ { "name": "R", "level": "Expert" }, { "name": "Python", "level": "Intermediate" }, { "name": "Full-stack web development", "level": "Intermediate", "keywords": [ "PHP", "JavaScript" ] }, { "name": "Docker", "level": "Intermediate" }, { "name": "C++", "level": "Basic" } ], "languages": [ { "language": "French", "fluency": "Native" }, { "language": "English", "fluency": "Fluent" }, { "language": "Arabic", "fluency": "Fluent" } ], "interests": [ { "name": "Network analysis" }, { "name": "Corruption" }, { "name": "Authoritarianism" }, { "name": "Organizations" }, { "name": "Information and Communication Technologies" } ], "publications": [ { "name": "It Takes a Village: Peer Effects and Externalities in Technology Adoption", "publisher": "American Journal of Political Science", "releaseDate": 2020, "url": "https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12471", "summary": "Do social networks matter for the adoption of new forms of political participation? We develop a formal model showing that the quality of communication that takes place in social networks is central to understanding whether a community will adopt forms of political participation where benefits are uncertain and where there are positive externalities associated with participation. Early adopters may exaggerate benefits, leading others to discount information about the technology's value. Thus, peer effects are likely to emerge only when informal institutions support truthful communication. We collect social network data for 16 Ugandan villages where an innovative mobile-based reporting platform was introduced. Consistent with our model, we find variation across villages in the extent of peer effects on technology adoption, as well as evidence supporting additional observable implications. Impediments to social diffusion may help explain the varied uptake of new and increasingly common political communication technologies around the world.", "authors": [ { "name": "Romain Ferrali", "url": "https://rferrali.net" }, { "url": "https://guygrossman.com/", "name": "Guy Grossman" }, { "url": "https://melinaplatas.com/", "name": "Melina Platas" }, { "url": "https://politicalscience.stanford.edu/people/jonathan-rodden", "name": "Jonathan Rodden" } ], "keywords": [ "New Technologies", "Social Networks", "Development" ], "type": "Publications" }, { "name": "Who Registers? Village Networks, Household Dynamics, and Voter Registration in Rural Uganda", "publisher": "Comparative Political Studies", "releaseDate": 2022, "url": "https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140211036048", "summary": "Who registers to vote? Although extensive research has examined the question of who votes, our understanding of the determinants of political participation will be limited until we know who is missing from the voter register. Studying voter registration in lower-income settings is particularly challenging due to data constraints. We link the official voter register with a complete social network census of 16 villages to analyze the correlates of voter registration in rural Uganda, examining the role of individual-level attributes and social ties. We find evidence that social ties are important for explaining registration status within and across households. Village leaders—and through them, household heads—play an important role in explaining the registration status of others in the village, suggesting a diffuse process of social influence. Socioeconomic factors such as income and education do not explain registration in this setting. Together these findings suggest an alternate theory of participation is required.", "authors": [ { "name": "Romain Ferrali", "url": "https://rferrali.net" }, { "url": "https://guygrossman.com/", "name": "Guy Grossman" }, { "url": "https://melinaplatas.com/", "name": "Melina Platas" }, { "url": "https://politicalscience.stanford.edu/people/jonathan-rodden", "name": "Jonathan Rodden" } ], "keywords": [ "Voting", "Social Networks", "Development" ], "type": "Publications" }, { "name": "Partners in Crime? Corruption as a Criminal Network", "publisher": "Games and Economic Behavior", "releaseDate": 2020, "url": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.013", "summary": "How does the structure of an organization affect corruption? This paper analyzes a model that views organizations as networks on which coalitions of corrupt accomplices may form. This network approach to corruption provides new insights into the problem: (i) corruption will arise in enclaves, i.e. coalitions that minimize joint exposure to witnesses, (ii) making the organization more connected may increase corruption, and (iii) corruption will involve larger coalitions under better monitoring. Simulation results also suggest that more hierarchical organizations are more corrupt than flatter organizations. I test these predictions in the lab. Results confirm the predictions and reveal a systematic deviation that has implications for why better monitoring reduces corruption: participants disproportionately fail to realize larger coalitions, which are more necessary under good monitoring. Results suggest it would be sensible to redesign public agencies to puncture the isolation of enclaves.", "authors": [ { "name": "Romain Ferrali", "url": "https://rferrali.net" } ], "keywords": [ "Social Networks", "Corruption", "Organizations", "Behavioral Economics", "Game Theory" ], "type": "Publications" }, { "name": "Institutional quality, campaign contributions, and favoritism in US federal government contracting", "publisher": "Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory", "releaseDate": 2023, "url": "https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muac026", "summary": "The impacts of money in US politics have long been debated. Building on principal-agent models, we test whether and to what degree companies' political donations lead to their favored treatment in federal procurement. We expect the impact of donations on favoritism to vary by the strength of control by political principals over their bureaucratic agents. We compile a comprehensive dataset of published federal contracts and registered campaign contributions for 2004-15. We develop risk indices capturing tendering practices and outcomes likely characterized by favoritism. Using fixed effects regressions, matching, and regression discontinuity analyses, we find confirming evidence for our theory. A large increase in donations from $10,000 to $5m (in USD) increases favoritism risks by about 1/4th standard deviation (SD). These effects are largely partisan, with firms donating to the party that holds the presidency showing higher risk. Donations influence favoritism risks most in less independent agencies: the same donation increases the risk of favoritism by an additional 1/3rd SD in agencies least insulated from politics. Exploiting sign-off thresholds, we demonstrate that donating contractors are subject to less scrutiny by political appointees.", "authors": [ { "name": "Romain Ferrali", "url": "https://rferrali.net" }, { "url": "http://mihalyfazekas.eu/", "name": "Mihály Fazekas" }, { "url": "https://johanneswachs.com/", "name": "Johannes Wachs" } ], "keywords": [ "Corruption", "Organizations" ], "type": "Publications" }, { "name": "The Unequal Diffusion of Honesty and Dishonesty in Workplace Networks", "publisher": "Management Science", "releaseDate": 2026, "url": "https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.01981", "summary": "Honest and dishonest behaviors may both diffuse among the members of an organization. Knowing which of the two spreads faster is important because it impacts the extent to which managers will need to resort to other, potentially more costly solutions to curb dishonest behavior. Assessing empirically which of honest or dishonest behavior spreads faster is challenging, because this requires field measurements of social relationships and dishonest behavior of individual members, which poses both measurement and inference problems. We examine an original, fine-grained dataset from a large company that allows for identifying agents likely to be dishonest and interactions among employees while offering a natural experiment that circumvents the inference problems associated with identifying peer-to-peer diffusion. We find (1) that dishonest behavior diffuses while honest behavior does not, (2) that diffusion likely operates through spreading information about opportunities for collusion, and (3) that policies that screen on dishonesty at hiring may be efficient to curb dishonest behavior in environments with high turnover.", "authors": [ { "name": "Romain Ferrali", "url": "https://rferrali.net" } ], "keywords": [ "Corruption", "Organizations", "Social Networks" ], "type": "Publications" }, { "name": "Can low-cost, scalable, online intervention increase youth informed political participation in electoral authoritarian contexts?", "publisher": "Science Advances", "releaseDate": 2023, "url": "https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.adf1222", "summary": "Young citizens vote at relatively low rates, which contributes to political parties de-prioritizing youth preferences. We analyze the effects of low-cost online interventions in encouraging young Moroccans to cast an informed vote in the 2021 elections. These interventions aim to reduce participation costs by providing information about the registration process and by highlighting the election's stakes and the distance between respondents' preferences and party platforms. Contrary to preregistered expectations, the interventions did not increase average turnout, yet exploratory analysis shows that the interventions designed to increase benefits did increase the turnout intention of uncertain baseline voters. Moreover, information about parties' platforms increased support for the party closest to the respondents' preferences, leading to better-informed voting. Results are consistent with motivated reasoning, which is surprising in a context with weak party institutionalization.", "authors": [ { "name": "Romain Ferrali", "url": "https://rferrali.net" }, { "url": "https://guygrossman.com/", "name": "Guy Grossman" }, { "url": "https://sites.google.com/site/hlarreguy/", "name": "Horacio Larreguy" } ], "keywords": [ "New Technologies", "Voting", "Development" ], "type": "Publications" }, { "name": "Audits and Bureaucratic Corruption: Evidence from Brazilian Municipalities", "url": "https://rferrali.net/files/brazil-bfkp.pdf", "summary": "Corruption is often a collective endeavor involving both politicians and bureaucrats, yet most research on anti-corruption policies focuses on disciplining politicians. We examine how audits affect bureaucrats using a randomized audit program of Brazilian municipalities. We establish that audits effectively punish corrupt bureaucrats: they increase dismissals and resignations, with effects concentrated among likely patronage hires. Leveraging a theoretical framework that views mayors as bureaucratic supervisors, we show that the mayor's decision to dismiss is driven by legal rather than electoral accountability concerns. Our findings have implications for the design of anti-corruption policies and suggest that while patronage appointments come with rents, they are also exposed to greater punishment.", "authors": [ { "name": "Romain Ferrali", "url": "https://rferrali.net" }, { "url": "http://renaud.bourles.perso.centrale-med.fr/", "name": "Renaud Bourlès" }, { "url": "https://galileukim.github.io/", "name": "Galileu Kim" }, { "url": "https://sites.google.com/view/julietapeveri", "name": "Julieta Peveri" } ], "keywords": [ "Corruption", "Organizations", "Development" ], "type": "Working Papers" }, { "name": "Extreme Protest Tactics Reduce Support for the Climate Movement and Climate Mitigation Policies", "url": "https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/n6aw2_v1", "summary": "In response to the escalating climate crisis, and with major climate policy reforms under debate across Europe, many environmental activists have turned to extreme protest tactics, such as vandalizing museums and obstructing major highways. Research suggests that extreme protest tactics - protest behaviors perceived to be highly disruptive, harmful to others, or both - may attract media attention, but typically reduce public support for protest groups (e.g., Feinberg et al., 2020). However, this research has focused primarily on Americans' responses to public protest. Additionally, little experimental research has tested the causal effects of extreme tactics in the context of the climate movement, even though it is the largest social movement in the world (Hasegawa, 2022). To address these gaps, we fielded a large, pre-registered online survey experiment, conducted on a representative sample of French citizens (n = 8,001), testing the effects of exposure to four protest actions featuring different degrees of extremity - a peaceful march, occupying an office building, blocking public transportation, and damaging infrastructure. Results showed that, relative to a control condition, extreme protest actions reduced support for the activist group, willingness to join the climate movement, and support for climate mitigation policies (e.g., a carbon tax on fossil fuel companies), with these reductions increasing proportional to the extremity of the protest actions. Additionally, we found no evidence that exposure to these extreme tactics led to greater support for a more moderate climate protest group, offering evidence against the “radical flank effect” found in previous research (Simpson et al., 2022). Overall, results show that previously demonstrated negative effects of extreme protest tactics on popular support for social movements and their policy goals extends to activism on climate change, and also generalizes beyond the U.S. to the European context, a critical setting for policy efforts to address climate change.", "authors": [ { "name": "Romain Ferrali", "url": "https://rferrali.net" }, { "url": "https://as.nyu.edu/departments/sociology/people/current-phd-students/kylie-fuller.html", "name": "Kylie Fuller" }, { "url": "https://www.linkedin.com/in/lucas-francou-damesin-13b16732/", "name": "Lucas Francou Damesin" }, { "url": "https://sc.edu/study/colleges_schools/artsandsciences/sociology/our_people/faculty_staff_directory/simpson_brent.php", "name": "Brent Simpson" }, { "url": "https://www.robbwiller.org/", "name": "Robb Willer" }, { "url": "https://izzygainsburg.wordpress.com/", "name": "Izzy Gainsburg" } ], "keywords": [], "type": "Working Papers" }, { "name": "Community Formation on Networks", "url": "https://rferrali.net/files/bfz-diffusion.pdf", "summary": "We study a strategic model of community formation on networks. Starting from a seed community member, the process of community formation is sequential, with infinitely-patient and forward-looking agents making strategic offers to their neighbours. Each agent makes an irreversible binary choice, and each time she accepts an offer, she joins the community. For arbitrary payoffs, there is essentially a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, which maximizes the payoff of the seed. Next, we assume that the payoffs are a function of the community and neighbourhood sizes. This allows us to pin down the different types of communities that emerge in the equilibrium. Such equilibrium communities are a direct function of the monotonicity -positive or negative- of payoffs in community and neighbourhood sizes. Finally, we examine the impact of a key-player policy on the formation of communities and how denser networks affect the welfare of the equilibrium communities. Our results are informative for several economic situations in which the formation of communities is salient.", "authors": [ { "name": "Romain Ferrali", "url": "https://rferrali.net" }, { "url": "https://sites.google.com/site/obochet2/", "name": "Olivier Bochet" }, { "url": "https://sites.google.com/site/yvesbzenou/", "name": "Yves Zenou" } ], "keywords": [ "Social Networks", "Game Theory" ], "type": "Working Papers" }, { "name": "Combatting the Repression of Online Activism in Authoritarian Settings", "url": "https://rferrali.net/files/harassment-fl.pdf", "summary": "Online harassment is widespread on social media, with severe consequences in authoritarian regimes where opposition figures are targeted. While counterspeech can mitigate hate speech in democracies, its impact on harassment in authoritarian contexts is less understood. An online experiment by an NGO in an authoritarian regime shows that private counterspeech increased victim activity and follower engagement, while public counterspeech reduced both, likely due to fear of retaliation. Consistent with the platform's lack of response, harassers were unaffected. These findings highlight limits of counterspeech to counter harassment in authoritarian settings and the need for context-sensitive approaches, particularly addressing fear of repression.", "authors": [ { "name": "Romain Ferrali", "url": "https://rferrali.net" }, { "url": "https://sites.google.com/site/hlarreguy/", "name": "Horacio Larreguy" } ], "keywords": [ "New Technologies", "Social Networks", "Development" ], "type": "Working Papers" } ], "volunteer": [ { "position": "Referee for _American Journal of Political Science_, _American Sociological Review_, _Economic Theory_, _Economic Journal_, _International Economic Review_, _Journal of Comparative Economics_, _Journal of Public Economics_, _Mathematical Social Science_, _World Politics_" }, { "organization": "Aix-Marseille School of Economics", "position": "Program head (\"responsable de formation\"), undergraduate program \"Cycle pluridisciplinaire d'études supérieures (CyPES) - Faire société\"", "startDate": 2023 }, { "organization": "Aix-Marseille School of Economics", "position": "Coordinator, General seminar series", "startDate": 2023 }, { "organization": "Aix-Marseille School of Economics", "position": "PhD placement officer", "startDate": 2022, "endDate": 2023 }, { "organization": "NYU Abu Dhabi", "position": "Postdoctoral representative of the Social Science Division and Secretary of the Postdoctoral Council Steering Committee", "startDate": 2020, "endDate": 2021 }, { "position": "Coordinator of Research Group in Network Science", "startDate": 2018, "endDate": 2021 }, { "organization": "American Political Science Association, Political Networks Division", "position": "Member of the jury of the John Sprague award", "startDate": 2020, "endDate": 2020 } ], "awards": [ { "title": "Tafra project \"SMIIG Data 2\" for the monitoring of freedom of access to information at the local, regional, and national levels in Morocco", "date": 2023, "awarder": "European Commission", "summary": "Grant awarded by European Commission (€213,000)" }, { "title": "\"The Mercury Project\" for the estimation of the causal impacts of disinformation in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic", "date": 2022, "awarder": "Social Science Research Council", "summary": "Grant awarded by Social Science Research Council ($150,000)" }, { "title": "Tafra project \"IMPACTS\" for the collection and dissemination of public procurement data in Morocco", "date": 2022, "awarder": "International Foundation for Electoral Systems and CEELI Institute", "summary": "Grant awarded by International Foundation for Electoral Systems and CEELI Institute ($20,000)" }, { "title": "Tafra project \"Elections 2021\" for the development of a mobile app on party platforms", "date": 2021, "awarder": "International Foundation for Electoral Systems", "summary": "Grant awarded by International Foundation for Electoral Systems ($15,000)" }, { "title": "Tafra project \"Elections 2021\" for the development of an electoral campaign management app", "date": 2021, "awarder": "Council of Europe", "summary": "Grant awarded by Council of Europe ($15,000)" }, { "title": "Tafra project \"Article 27\" phase II on Moroccan Freedom of Information Act", "date": 2019, "awarder": "US State Department", "summary": "Grant awarded by US State Department ($150,000)" }, { "title": "Academic Partnership between Maxwell School of Public Affairs (Syracuse University), University Mohamed V, and Tafra", "date": 2019, "awarder": "US Embassy in Morocco", "summary": "Grant awarded by US Embassy in Morocco ($25,000)" }, { "title": "Tafra project \"Datafra\" for the development of a mobile app enabling access to public data", "date": 2019, "awarder": "European Endowment for Democracy", "summary": "Grant awarded by European Endowment for Democracy (€100,000)" }, { "title": "Tafra project for international workshop and following publication on implementation of Moroccan Freedom of Information Act", "date": 2018, "awarder": "OECD, UNESCO, Article 19", "summary": "Grant awarded by OECD ($10,000), UNESCO ($3,000), Article 19 ($3,000)" }, { "title": "Tafra project \"Article 27\" for collection, analysis, and dissemination of electoral data", "date": 2017, "awarder": "Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), US Embassy in Morocco", "summary": "Grant awarded by Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), US Embassy in Morocco ($147,000)" }, { "title": "Graduate Dissertation Research Grant", "date": 2016, "awarder": "Bobst center for Peace and Justice, Princeton University", "summary": "Grant awarded by Bobst center for Peace and Justice, Princeton University ($1,000)" }, { "title": "Graduate Dissertation Research Grant", "date": 2015, "awarder": "Bobst center for Peace and Justice, Princeton University", "summary": "Grant awarded by Bobst center for Peace and Justice, Princeton University ($5,000)" }, { "title": "Graduate Research Award", "date": 2014, "awarder": "Center for the Study of Social Organization, Princeton University", "summary": "Grant awarded by Center for the Study of Social Organization, Princeton University ($5,000)" } ], "projects": [ { "name": "The Economics of Social Networks", "endDate": "Fall 2024, 2025", "summary": "This course provides an introduction to a fast-growing, new field of research, the economics of social networks, both from a theoretical and an empirical perspective. We first discuss how to describe networks, then move on to questions of network formation, and finally analyze questions of behavior on networks.\n", "highlights": [ "Workload: 24 hours lecture", "Class size: 15", "Language: English", "Level: Graduate" ], "type": "course", "roles": [ "Professor" ], "entity": "Aix-Marseille School of Economics", "url": "https://rferrali.net/files/syllabus-networks.pdf" }, { "name": "Development", "endDate": "Fall 2023 to 2025", "summary": "This course covers development and state formation in the long run. It provides an introduction to the microeconomic and political issues surrounding development. We cover the role of institutions, the state, and the economy in development by discussing a series of major pieces from the literature.\n", "highlights": [ "Workload: 12 hours lecture, 12 hours tutorial", "Class size: 40", "Language: French", "Level: Undergraduate" ], "type": "course", "roles": [ "Professor" ], "entity": "Aix-Marseille School of Economics", "url": "https://rferrali.net/files/development-syllabus.pdf" }, { "name": "Political Game Theory", "endDate": "Fall 2024, 2025", "summary": "This course provides an introduction to game theory applied to classical problems in political economy. Through these applications, we cover standard classes of games and their related solution concepts. Specifically, we cover static and dynamic games of complete and incomplete information. Emphasis is given to rigorous treatment of the underlying mathematical concepts.\n", "highlights": [ "Workload: 24 hours lecture", "Class size: 10", "Language: English", "Level: Undergraduate" ], "type": "course", "roles": [ "Professor" ], "entity": "Aix-Marseille School of Economics", "url": "https://rferrali.net/files/political-game-theory-syllabus.pdf" }, { "name": "Political Economy", "endDate": "Fall 2025", "summary": "This course provides a formal introduction to political economy, with a specific emphasis on electoral competition. We start with a primer on game theory, then cover standard models of political competition and contextualize them using recent political history, trying to understand the causes underlying convergence and divergence in party platforms.\n", "highlights": [ "Workload: 12 hours lecture, 12 hours tutorial", "Class size: 40", "Language: French", "Level: Undergraduate" ], "type": "course", "roles": [ "Professor" ], "entity": "Aix-Marseille School of Economics", "url": "https://rferrali.net/files/syllabus-political-economy.pdf" }, { "name": "Topics in Advanced Microeconomics", "endDate": "Fall 2022, 2023, 2025", "summary": "This course provides an in-depth coverage of selected topics in microeconomics, including demand theory and information economics. An emphasis will be given to rigorous mathematical treatment of these issues. The necessary mathematical tools will be reviewed accordingly.\n", "highlights": [ "Workload: 24 hours lecture", "Class size: 10", "Language: English", "Level: Undergraduate" ], "type": "course", "roles": [ "Professor" ], "entity": "Aix-Marseille School of Economics", "url": "https://rferrali.net/files/topics-advanced-micro-syllabus.pdf" }, { "name": "Econometric Methods for Causal Inference", "endDate": "Spring 2025", "summary": "This course defines causal effects and reviews causes for bias in their estimation. We review a series of common techniques in the field: randomized controlled trials, instrumental variables, difference-in-differences estimators, matching, and regression discontinuity designs.\n", "highlights": [ "Workload: 24 hours", "Class size: 40", "Language: English", "Level: Graduate" ], "type": "course", "roles": [ "Professor" ], "entity": "Aix-Marseille School of Economics", "url": "https://rferrali.net/files/causal-inference-syllabus.pdf" }, { "name": "Formal methods in Economics", "endDate": "Spring 2025", "summary": "This course provides an introduction to the use of formal methods in economics, through examples from microeconomic theory. We cover consumer and producer theory, as well as market equilibrium. The course is designed to be accessible to students with a basic knowledge of calculus.", "highlights": [ "Workload: 12 hours lecture, 12 hours tutorial", "Class size: 40", "Language: French", "Level: Undergraduate" ], "type": "course", "roles": [ "Professor" ], "entity": "Aix-Marseille School of Economics", "url": "https://rferrali.net/files/formal-economics-syllabus.pdf" }, { "name": "Microeconomics of the firm", "endDate": "Spring 2022, 2023", "summary": "This course provides a non-technical introduction to the microeconomics of the firm. We will cover producer theory, competition, and other questions in the microeconomics of the firm. 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